GUEST COLUMN — Enshrining native self rule in Canada’s

New constitutional provisions enshrining aboriginal self-government have prompted expressions of grave concern from some associated with Canada’s resource industries. Ostensibly this concern is rooted in the undefined nature of self-government, and the implications this principle may have for settling disputes over native land claims and resource extraction. First tell us what is meant by aboriginal self-government, they insist. Being clear on the specifics must precede the enshrining of a general principle in Canada’s Constitution.

Upon closer scrutiny, however, it becomes clear that this argument just doesn’t hold water. The Canadian Constitution is already full of general and undefined principles which members of Canada’s resource industries accept without difficulty. Freedom of speech is one of them. And just what are the implications of this principle? Does freedom of speech mean Ernst Zundel has the right to publish hate literature? Does it mean that newspaper editors are obliged to provide space to any and all views? And what about the principle of security of the person? Does it mean, as the Supreme Court has found, that a woman has the right to an abortion? Or does it mean, as the anti-choice movement has argued, that the fetus, being a person, has the right to come to term without interference?

The point is that we seem to be quite capable of living with ambiguity about the exact meaning of these general principles. We are quite ready to allow definition to be given to them over time through the courts and legislatures. Nor can it be argued that their implications for how we live and work are less than fundamental.

That raises an interesting question. Why are we so ready to live with ambiguity in terms of some principles, while others — aboriginal self-government being the operative example — provoke such consternation? The answer lies in the different traditions these principles represent, and the different interests they serve.

Traditional principles like freedom of speech and security of the person are expressions of the liberal tradition of individual rights. This tradition and conception of rights is a product of the shift from feudalism to capitalism, and meshes nicely with the interests of private enterprise.

The principle of aboriginal self-government, in contrast, corresponds to a collectivist tradition of group rights. This tradition has gained ground as awareness has grown that not all members of society have been equally well served by the liberal tradition of individual rights. It is, after all, under the dominance of the liberal conception of rights that Canada’s aboriginal peoples have fallen to a standard of living and a quality of life more in line with the poorer regions of the Third World. Hence there is the call for collectively based group rights which can restore a sense of dignity and a measure of self-determination.

Ultimately, arguments against aboriginal self-government on the basis of the lack of specifics are no more than smoke and mirrors. What it really comes down to is a judgment call. On one side there is hand-wringing about a future loss of autonomy should the principle of self-government require industry to accommodate the interests of aboriginal peoples. On the other side are the concrete agonies and substantive disadvantages being suffered by Canada’s aboriginal peoples in the present.

What is disquieting is not the prospect of the enshrinement of the principle of aboriginal self-government in the Canadian Constitution. What is disquieting is that some elements of the Canadian resource industry seem to exercise judgments about the public good on the basis of nothing but narrow conceptions of self-interest.

— Mark Neufeld is an assistant professor at Trent University’s Department of Political Studies in Peterborough, Ont.